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ENVIRONMENTAL FAUST SUCCUMBS TO 
TEMPTATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
MEPHISTOPHELE$, OR, VALUE BY ANY 
OTHER NAME IS PREFERENCE 
Carol M. Rose* 
THE EcONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT. By Mark Sago.ff. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1988. Pp. x, 271. $29.95. 
In several of the chapters to his new book, Mark Sagoff begins by 
telling some story to frame the remainder. One of these is particularly 
significant for the book: Sagoff retells a New Yorker joke in whfoh the 
Devil tells the new entrants to Hell that they are leaving right and 
wrong behind, and entering a world of mere preferences (p. 99). The 
Devil signifies for Sagoff the economics-oriented policy analyst, and 
the story is prophetic because by the end of the book, that old prefer-
ence-counting Devil has caught up with Sagoff. 
· The word "environment" appeared in the titles of several of the 
~arlier essays on which· the book is based, 1 but the book has wisely 
subordinated that E-word to a subtitle; despite the frequent invocation 
of natural wonders and scenic areas, the book doesn't really focus on 
the environment until the last chapter. Nope, this book is about that 
other E-word, Economics, which is so favored by the Devil. More 
specifically, at least until that last chapter, the book is about how dev-
ilishly daffy economists are when they talk about the environment. 
Sagoff thinks their clever confusions are at best distracting and at 
worst antidemocratic (pp. 10, 95-97), and if we don't watch out, they 
are going to lead us off the ethical path and straight down the road to 
perdition. 
Up to the book's end, only an occasional grudging concession2 re-
lieves the hellfire-and-brimstone economics-bashing. Consequently, 
dear Reader, you will be ill-prepared for that last chapter where, lo 
and behold!, it turns out that the true path to environmental paradise 
is through tradeable emission rights (pp. 209-10). What? What? 
Tradeable emission rights have been pushed for years by those diaboli-
• Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1962, Antioch College; M.A. 
(Political Science) 1963, University of Chicago; Ph.D. (History) 1969, Cornell University; J.D. 
1977, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. P. x (listing earlier history). 
2. See, e.g., pp. 71-73. 
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cal economists;3 so you may well put this book down with the thought 
that somebody has been hoodwinked into a pact with the Devil - or 
at least that, as with Faust, two souls struggle, ach, within the author's 
breast. 
This book, like Sagoff 's work generally, will quite rightly interest 
many people who are looking for fresh approaches to environmental 
issues. But at least some readers will be disconcerted or confused by 
the book's odd internal tension, and so I want to look at each side of 
the duality more carefully. I am going to focus first on the (anti-eco-
nomic) soul of the book. Then I will turn to the other soul, and partic-
ularly to the implications of the last chapter's concessions to tradeable 
pollution rights. Finally, I will go back to the first and dominant soul, 
to try to locate the source of the author's general dyspepsia about eco-
nomics, because I think his own book suggests some more charitable 
ways to think about the devilish dismal science in the environmental 
context. 
I. NUMBER ONE SOUL ATTEMPTS TO CAST 
OUT ECONOMIC DEVILS 
Sagoff 's book sets up a number of oppositions or contrasts that will 
be familiar to readers of his earlier articles. It is not hard to see that in 
these oppositions, Sagoff wants to preserve the high ground for his 
own "ethical" point of view. Here are the big ones: 
Ethics vs. Economics (pp. 80, 92, 196) 
[Public] Values vs. [Private] Preferences (pp. 9, 90) 
Citizen vs. Consumer (pp. 7, 27, 53) 
Deliberation vs. Dogmatism (pp. 12, 77) 
Environmental issues, he says, have to do with the left-hand side 
- ethics, values, citizens, and deliberation - and not with economics, 
preferences, consumerism, or dogmatic pseudoscience. Now, can you 
guess which side wears the white robes, and which side has the horns 
and tail? If you don't get the message, you might try one of the au-
thor's narrative versions of the oppositions: for example, the contrast 
between a "majestic million-year-old wilderness" on the one hand, and 
"Disney playland[s]" and "commercial honky-tonk[s]" on the other.4 
3. For a recent discussion of the merits of such schemes, see Ackerman & Stewart, Re· 
forming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-51, 1360-64 (1985), and authorities 
cited therein (particularly at 1337 n.11) (response to Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Effi· 
ciency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and ''Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 31 STAN. 
L. REv. 1267 (1985)). 
4. Pp. 52, 59-60. Some, including my colleague Mark Grady, who professes to have visited 
the Magic Kingdom well over 200 times, may take offense at the implicit disparagement of Dis-
ney enterprises. I myself take offense at the totally misguided disparagement of honky-tonks. To 
the connoisseur, the honky-tonk represents a charming mix of pedal steel guitars, wailin' tunes, 
longneck beer bottles, and the Texas two-step, as in Hank Williams' classic lines, "If you got the 
money, Honey/ I got the Ti-i-i-me/ We'll go honky-tonkin' and we'll have a time." Moreover, 
the word draws out subtle arguments about gender roles, as in the controversy begun in Hank 
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So just how high is this high ground that Sagoff is appropriating 
for his left-hand side of the column? The best way to find out is to 
think through the oppositions. 
A. Ethics vs. Economics 
After reading this book, I still don't quite know what this ethics 
stuff is for Sagoff, or why he plays ethics off against economics. In 
fact, Sagoff himself doesn't give the reader many clues about what he 
is calling "ethical" until well into the book, when he starts to tell us 
something about the "nonnative position" (p. 90). But it's still not so 
clear; here and elsewhere he gives Kant pretty big play,5 and it seems 
that by "ethics" he means something like Kantian categorical impera-
tives, and that "ethics" have to do with actions that are right in them-
selves. Some of the time it sounds as if he doesn't include 
consequentialism in the category of ethical thinking at all, 6 but then 
again, he sometimes seems to approve of talk about the "good" as well 
as the "right" (pp. 94, 155-58). It's all a bit murky. 
Either way - whether "ethics" is about the right thing to do, or 
about the good life - one might well ask: Why should either view be 
opposed to economics? If you take the economists at their word, they 
are quite happy to have you approach issues in either of those ways, or 
in some other way if you like. They don't care if you want to do the 
right thing, or alternatively, if you want to do the thing that will lead 
to good results. They just want to know what everybody thinks are 
the right things to do (or, if it's allowed, what everybody thinks are 
Thompson's The Wild Side of Life ("I didn't know God made honky-tonk angels/ I might have 
known you'd never make a wife") (Capital 1952), and responded to by Kitty Wells, It Wasn't 
God Who Made Honky-tonk Angels (Decca 1952) (my emphasis). My thanks to Ronnie Pugh of 
the Country Music Hall of Fame and Museum in Nashville for assistance on this point. 
5. E.g .• pp. 44, 155-56. 
6. For example, when Sagoff describes environmentalists as taking a "moral" position about 
the environment, p. 154, which apparently precludes consideration of welfare-enhancement, he 
has already contrasted his "moral" position to utilitarianism. P. 152. This would suggest that he 
does not think utilitarianism or consequentialism is "ethical" or "moral." The same view seems 
to be behind a rather odd argument he makes against the welfare economists' goal of efficiency. 
He argues that this position is not really consequentialist or utilitarian at all, since it considers 
expected utility rather than actual consequences. Pp. 104-07. He cites the case of poor Romeo's 
purchase of poison, and his mistaken expectation of relative happiness from the transaction, to 
show how a,ctual consequences diverge from expected ones. P. 105. An economist, of course, 
might point out that Romeo's real problem was an insufficient market for information, but I will 
put that to one side. What is odd about the argument is that any consequentialist ethic is based 
on guesses about the future (i.e., expected outcomes), and of course runs the risk of mistakes 
about actual outcomes. Indeed, Sagoff is repeating one of Kant's critiques of consequentialism 
generally - that human beings' will is not directed at appropriate consequences in advance, and 
that one does not know how one's supposedly utility-maximizing behavior will come out in fact. 
See I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 27, 47-48 (f. Ab-
bott trans. 1987) (people make mistakes about outcomes, can't know what will make them happy 
and thus can't act on definite principles to achieve that end). If one rejects efficiency because it is 
oriented to expected gains, one also rejects consequentialism generally - again suggesting that 
Sagoff rejects consequentialism as an ethical position. 
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good results). After they get an answer to those questions, economists 
want to take a further step, to try to get the most of whatever it is that 
people think is right (or good). 7 
So clean air is what you think is right, or good? Great, says the 
economist. Now, how good or right do you think it is? Do you think 
having electricity is right too (perhaps because it's right to have light, 
heat, and dialysis machines)? You do? That's great too. Now, elec-
tricity generation usually messes up some clean air, and this is where 
the economists think they can be helpful: They think they can help 
you to decide between two right actions if you can't do both, or, at 
least, if you can't do all you want of both. 
On this issue, they think, you're not going to get anyplace by say-
ing that clean air and electricity are both good, or right, or really, 
really, really tj.ght or good. When you can't have all you would like of 
both, all that stuff is just palaver. You've got to ask the questions the 
economists ask: Which course do you think is better, and at what 
levels? How much clean air is better than how much electricity? 
That's what economists are trying to find out when they ask those 
annoying questio"ns about how much you would pay for environmental 
goods, or values, or whatever. They aren't telling you what to value, 
but are trying to find out what you do value, and how much, by com-
parison to other things you value. 
Sagoffmakes a big deal of the way people get mad sometimes when 
economists ask them those weird questions about how much they 
would pay for environmental goods like clean air and wilderness (pp. 
83-84). He takes these reactions as a signal that economists aren't 
thinking about the environment as citizens would, that is, in an ethical 
way. But what's the big surprise if people get mad at those kinds of 
questions? None of us likes the news that the preservation of one re-
source may come at the cost of something else. We dislike that news 
most of all when we were thinking that at least some of our favorite 
resources were free. But then, that's why we have environmental 
problems, isn't it? Here we were, humming along with the happy 
thought that the best things in life are free, and using up air and wil-
derness with the reckless abandon we reserve for "free" goods. Now, 
along comes some squinty-eyed economist with a lot of questions 
about how much we would pay for those things. No wonder every-
body wants to shoot the messenger. Pay? For air? For the great out-
doors? Who is this bozo? 
7. See Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criti· 
cisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 450-52 (1975). Sagoff(e.g., at 43, 45-46) thinks that this kind of neutral-
ity neglects the difference between political values and personal preferences. See, e.g., pp. 43, 45-
46; see also infra text accompanying note 33. But Dan Farber, who rejects Sagoff's values/ 
preferences dichotomy, points out that rioneconomists may be persuaded on grounds of political 
theory to share the economists' neutrality on values. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theo-
rem, 1986 u. ILL. L. REV. 337, 350-51. 
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He's the successor to Adam Smith, that's who. And before you do 
shoot the messenger, just remember, he doesn't have anything against 
Immanuel Kant, whatever Sagoff might think; he just wants to know 
how the Kantian aspirations come out when they conflict at the mar-
gin, in this vale of tears called scarce resources. Remember, when the 
economist asks those creepy questions about paying, he's not trying to 
tell you what you should or shouldn't value; he's just asking what you 
do value, and how much, so that he can help you figure out how to get 
the most of what you do value, when your values can't all be satisfied 
at once. 8 What's the matter with that? Surely you don't want to have 
or do less of whatever things your ethics tell you are the right things to 
have and do. 
So Sagoff's opposition, Ethics vs. Economics, doesn't look all that 
convincing as an opposition after all. Through the book, Sagoff drops 
a few hints that he may not quite believe in it himself, 9 and by the last 
chapter, he seems to tank it altogether.10 How about the other 
oppositions? 
B. Values vs. Preferences; Citizen vs. Consumer 
These two oppositions are so closely intertwined that I have to d~ 
with them together. Early in the book, one noti~s that Sagoff rails at 
economists for failing to take environmental "values" into account, 
and th~n he turns around and rails at them even more when they try 
to do just that. 11 The poor economists: First everybody said they ig-
nored nonmarket goods, like wildlife and mountainous scenery; and 
no"'. here is Sagoff telling them they are imbeciles and rogues for try-
ing to translate those nonmarket goods into a cost-benefit calculation 
for decisionmakers. What's going on here? 
What's going on, Sagoff says, is that tfConomists want to talk about 
environmental matters as ifthey were (private) "preferences," when 
they really are (public) "values" (p. 93). When people talk about the 
environment, he says, they aren't talking about y.rhat they prefer for 
private consumption; they are talking, as citizens, about the things 
that have vatue for the whole community (p. 94). So you can't just do 
a cost-benefit analysis of envirorunep.tal values, as if you ~ere adding 
8. Note that the tradeolfs are not just between, say, industry ~d clean, air, but also among 
industry-with-some-co!!l-scrubbers, sort-of-clean air, and a lot of other things we want. You can 
have some industry, and some clean air, if you pay for the scrubbers, and you can have even 
cleaner air if you pay for more scrubbers, but the scrubbers themselves aren't costless. They, 
divert resources, talent, and worktime that might have contributed to other activities, such as 
constructing violins or firiding a vaccine for AIDS. 
9. See, e.g., pp. 71-72 (perfect enviionmental purity may give 'way to other considerations); p. 
80 ("We must acknowledge, however idealistic we may be, that clean air, workplace safety, and 
the like have a price .. , . "). 
10. Pp. 195-224. See infra text at notes 26-28. 
11. E.g .• pp. 9-10, 27, 35-39, 90-91. 
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up what people say they would pay for a pastrami sandwich. With the 
environment, they are talking about what is valuable for the commu-
nity as a whole, not their private preferences. 
Now, get ready, because here comes the clincher: Mixing up these 
discourses, Sagoff says, is a "category mistake" (p. 92). "Category 
mistake"? My Irish grandfather, who sold liquor, would have said, 
"Darlin', when they say somethin' fancy like that, close the cash regis-
ter." But I will take the risk of leaving the register open for the time 
being, and take up the point. 
The point is, I don't. know where this alleged category mistake 
happens. Or if there is some mistake, it is a mistake that is thoroughly 
embedded in ordinary discourse; and this makes it a little harder to see 
as a mistake in the first place, at least for somebody like Sagoff, who 
professes to reject dogmatic versions of knowledge in favor of Richard 
Rorty's kibbitzing approach. 12 
Let me unpack this: 
(i) Just for starters, why does Sagoff seem to think that public val-
ues are a matter of discussion, while private preferences aren't, and are 
just hanging there like lurking components of an idiot id? Surely pref-
erences - including consumer preferences - are educable. 13 Once 
educated, we may start to call preferences "tastes," but the point re-
mains: One can educate one's preference for movies, beer, music, and 
all the rest. Moreover, people routinely do so through discussion with 
other people. 
For argument's sake, let's go along with Sagoff's view that one's 
liking for ski areas is a private or consumer "preference," as opposed 
to the public "value" in one's yen for wilderness (p. 52). Surely people 
can educate their liking for either ski areas or wildernesses, and surely 
they can learn to like one more than the other. It hardly seems a 
"category mistake" to see both consumer preferences and so-called 
public values as learned, and educable, desiderata. 
(ii) More generally, why does he think there is some qualitative 
difference between public values and private preferences? People mix 
up private and civic concerns all the time, and put them all in the same 
hopper. Sagoff's students, who valiantly chose wilderness despite 
their fondness for ski resorts (pp. 52, 70-73), may well have wanted 
both wilderness and ski areas, but they may just have wanted wilder-
ness more, and chose wilderness when they knew they couldn't have 
12. Pp. 12, 222. See also text at notes 22-2S. Rorty himself describes his approach to knowl-
edge as "conversation," and also uses the phrase "useful kibitzing." See R. RORTY, PHILOSO· 
PHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 391, 393 (1979) (rejecting epistemological notions of 
mirroring truth, in favor of more open-ended conversation). 
13. Sagolf does acknowledge that private tastes may be educable, p. 104, but most of his 
discussion sharply distinguishes individual values on public matters, which are shared and dis-
cussed with others, from the personal preferences that seem to be undiscussed and amoral. See, 
e.g., pp. SS, 100, 104. 
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both in one place.14 But they are still considering the two not as quali-
tatively separate categories, but as alternative good things. 
It is no big secret that people think and talk about a lot of public 
and private matters as alternative goods. Take for example a citizen's 
reaction to a proposal for a new sidewalk. assessment. She thinks, in 
rapid succession: (1) Gee, a new sidewalk would look great in front of 
the house; and (2) it would make the whole block look spiffier, and 
give the neighborhood a boost; but (3) it does sound kind of expensive 
for my budget; and ( 4) it is really going to take a bite out of old Mrs. 
Jones' pension. 
This is an entirely normal progression of thinking about civic deci-
sions. Does anyone except Sagoff really think that there is some sharp 
divider between the "public" and the "private" aspects of these reflec-
tions, or that some of these aspects are inappropriate to the citizenry's 
deliberations on matters of public importance?l5 
(iii) To illustrate the supposed category mistake in mixing prefer-
ences with values, Sagoff occasionally poses a cute hypothetical: 
Someone who is promoting a particular public policy is asked how 
much he would pay to have his policy put into place (pp. 9-10, 223). 
The very question is supposed to illustrate that it is ridiculous to mix 
preference-talk with value-talk. 
Well, one can agree that this would normally be an odd sort of 
question, but one still wouldn't have to concede that there is some 
absurdity in policymakers' consideration of preferences. For one 
thing, sad to say, sometimes policymakers are thinking about how 
much they would pay, or to put it on the other side of the Coase theo-
rem, how much they are getting paid for taking particular public pol-
icy positions. That is to say, they are thinking about their own 
consumer preferences when they support certain public policies, be-
cause someone is going to pay them for supporting those public 
policies.16 . 
Naturally, we think this is wrong. But it isn't wrong because the 
legislators are thinking about preferences as such. · It is wrong because 
they are thinking about the wrong people's preferences - they are sup-
14. Or maybe in this class, they thought they would be well advised to want wilderness more. 
15. For another critique of Sagoff's division of personal and civic values, see Farber, supra 
note 7, at 344, 347. Cass Sunstein, some of whose work Sagoffapprovingly cites, pp. 10-11, does 
distinguish public and private spheres but does not qualitatively distinguish private preferences 
from civic values; he rather speaks of levels of preferences, noting that we may have preferences 
about preferences: we wish we didn't like to smoke, we wish we were more inclined to wear seat 
belts, etc. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 
1140 (1986). 
16. According to some law-and-economics commentators, that seems to be all that legislators 
are thinking about, whether they decide for or against legislation. See McChesney, Rent Extrac-
tion and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101, 102-03 
(1987) (politicians seek to maximize their own ret1:,1rns by forbearing from regulation costly to 
others). 
1638 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1631 
posed to be thinking about their constituents' preferences and not their 
own. As Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued, the legislator who accepts 
a bribe violates an agency relationship with his constituents, because 
he is supposed to be thinking about the constituents' preferences,' and 
instead he is thinking about his own.17 But the legislator still should 
be thinking about preferences - that is, those of his constituents. If 
he isn't, he may not be in office too long, because those constituents 
are certainly considering consumer preferences when they think about, 
say, whether they want a bond issue to fund the public schools, or 
whether they want to clean up the roadsides at the expense of paying a 
bottle deposit, and how they want their representat~ve to vote on those 
matters. 18 This is not to say that private consumption preferences are 
the only thing that citizens (or their representatives) think about with 
respect to public affairs, but it is one of the things they think about. 
What we really may want from our political leaders is some education 
of our preferences in matters relating to public affairs; after all, they 
are in office, and are supposed to have the time to think about these 
things and explain them to -the rest of us working stiffs. But citizens 
and policymakers don't take a vacation from preferences and utility 
maximization jqst because they are talking about public issues. 
So where's the category mistake in mixing up citizens' values and 
consumers' preferences? I think I've lost it. Moreover, I think most 
people never dreamed of it. Ordinary language mixes these up, and 
treats all of them as appropriate grist in the political "deliberation" or 
"conversation"19 about public decisions, whether they be environmen-
tal or something else. 
Despite all this, Sagoff is clearly right that there probably is .one 
important sense in which community goals may diverge from the sum 
of individual preferences. Take public health, for example: Individual 
health has repercussions beyond the healthy individual, not only be-
cause the healthy person doesn't infect others, but also because she 
holds a job, plays on the neighborhood softball team, acts cheerful, 
and in general passes on some nice positive externalities to others. But 
because some of these good things are externalities, she might be 
17. s. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CoRRUPTION: A STUDY IN PoLmCAL EcONOMY (1978). See 
also Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 587 
(1975). Sagoffprofesses to have some experience with bribes, p. 52, and might object that bribing 
a judge is different, because a judge is not supposed to be thinking about constituent preferences. 
But a judge should be thinking about constituents' "preferences about preferences," as these are 
incorporated into the rules of behavior that constituents have given themselves. See Sunstein, 
supra note 15. 
18. When Sagoff suggests that costs are unimportant by saying, for example, that mainte· 
nance of the national parks in the face of economic progress is an ethical, and not an economic, 
issue, he may be understating the significance of cost considerations in political decisions. See, 
e.g., Girdner, Timber War Pits Law Students vs. Laggers, Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1988, at 53, col. 
3 (describing local opposition to student efforts to preserve old-growth forestS). 
19. "Conversation" is from Richard Rorty, whom Sagoff cites approvingly. See supra note 
12. 
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tempted to scrimp on expenditures for her own health. And the same 
goes for everyone else in the community: taken in the aggregate, indi-
viduals might not put enough resources into things that are beneficial 
not just to themselves, but to everybody else too. But the community 
as a whole will be better off with a higher level of expenditure. The 
more general point is that the community as a whole has objectives 
that may differ from the sum of individual wishes; perhaps this was 
what Rousseau had in mind with all the pluses and minuses in the 
"general will."20 On these matters, we want citizens and legislators to 
pay attention to common goods and evils, which do diverge from ag-
gregated individual preferences. 
This is not news in the literature from economics and economics-
influenced branches of political science. On the contrary, there is a 
whole body of work out there about public goods and positive sum 
cooperative "games," and though not all of it is written by creepy neo-
classical economists, economists have certainly had some influence on 
the discussion. 21 · It is a pity that Sagoff does not seem to have ad-
dressed this work, for two reasons. First, some of this literature offers 
some reasons for the public preservation of the environmental goods 
that Sagoff rightly thinks are so important. And second, this literature 
poses very important political questions about how people might get 
over the impulses they have to act self-interestedly, under circum-
stances where narrow self-interest is inappropriate, and· why they 
might cooperate instead for a greater common good - questions that 
seem to me to be central to Sagoff 's interest in public values. I will 
come back to this later. 
C. Deliberation vs. Dogma 
I am not going to say much about this opposition here. It's now 
quite trendy to describe one's opponents as snapping their chops over 
dogmatic scientism, while describing oneself as engaging in delibera-
tion or conversation, where the participants are civil and open-
minded. 22 No doubt deliberation is a good thing. ·But here it looks a 
20. William Ophuls, in the context of his discussion of the "tragedy of the commons," notes 
the relationship between Rousseau's "general will" and the divergence between community good 
and additive individual preferences. w. OPHULS, EcOLOGY AND THE POLmCS OF SCARCITY: 
PROLOGUE TO A PoLmCAL THEORY OF THE STEADY STATE 150-51 (1977). Sagotr also men-
tions Rousseau, although he does not give the same reasons for the difference between individual 
and common goals. P. 11. 
21. See, e.g., R. DORFMAN, MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS 4-5 
(1965); R. HARDIN, CoLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); Hirschleifer, Evolutionary Models in Econom-
ics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RE.s. L. & EcoN. 1 (1982); Schelling, 
Hockey Helmets, Daylight Saving, and Other .Binary Choices, in MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 211 (1978). 
22. For a witty example, see "D.A.F." [D. Farber], The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 13, 14-16 (1988) (complains about law review articles' excessive length and footnotes as 
attempts to have last word instead of engaging in "conversation" a la Richard Rorty). 
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little like a trick, because the reader never does get much of a sense of 
what the deliberation is supposed to be about. In fact, it looks as if the 
deliberation isn't supposed to be about anything in particular.23 
Dressing up a nonposition as "deliberation" seems like thin stuff, and 
not much more than another effort to lay claim to the high ground -
sort of like opposing gorgeous scenery to honkytonks. Yeah, yeah, 
maybe the economics crowd does tout itself as predictive scientists,24 
but it doesn't sound very civil and open-minded to say they are just 
making "category mistakes" either - in fact, the very phrase sounds 
like the kind of Intimidator Ray Gun that philosophers whip out to 
shut up everybody else.25 Now, I do think there is more to Sagoff's 
claim to "deliberation" than just posturing, and I'll come back to it, 
but I don't think Sagoff has spelled it out well enough to do justice to 
his own position vis-a-vis those economic devils. 
Maybe that's why they get him by the end of the book. 
II. NUMBER Two SOUL GIVES IN TO TRADEABLE 
EMISSION RIGHTS 
A kind of diabolical conversion occurs in the last chapter of this 
book, where Sagoff puts in a plug for tradeable emission rights -
those inventions of economic environmentalists.26 The tradeable emis-
sion right idea (which I will call TER) is now a familiar one. In this 
scheme, we start by setting overall ambient limits for any given pollu-
tant, first by guessing about our health-based and aesthetic tolerance 
to the pollutant, and then by weighing those factors against our need 
for products that require the pollutant, and other costs incurred in 
restraining it. After we have made these calculations and set upper 
limits, would-be polluters can get permits to pollute, but they have to 
bid and trade for these now-scarce entitlements. This makes polluters 
more cost-conscious and more likely to find ways to cut back on their 
pollution, but we leave it to them to figure out the most cost-effective 
ways to do so; this is presumably cheaper and more flexible than 
would be our own efforts to try to figure out controls for them. 
In my view, Sagoff's chapter bringing up this approach is among 
the most sensible and interesting parts of his book, because it is the 
one place where he starts to reckon with the problem of scarce re-
sources, and with the difficulties of allocating and restraining uses of 
23. E.g., pp. 215-16. 
24. See White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1967-68 (1987) (econo-
mists, as example of "conceptual" thinking, may see role as putting forth verifiable hypotheses in 
manner of science). 
25. Not that economists are easy to shut up - they've got some ray guns of their own, like 
"cross-elasticity." What could be more of a silencer than that? - maybe the lit-crit crowd's 
phronesis, or trope, or aporia. For a comment on "fancy scholarship" in the law, see Schlag, 
Comment: The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. R.Ev. 917 (1987). 
26. See supra note 3. 
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resources that are normally seen as "commons." But I think his en-
dorsement of the TER idea creates some problems for his position 
about environmental values, and that TER really undermines the 
whole set of oppositions that inform the bulk of the book. The basic 
problem is that the structure of tradeable emission rights serves up 
values and ethics right along with mere low-life consumer preferences. 
In a TER regime, everything is on the menu, and everything gets 
traded off with everything else. 
Sagoff likes TER, because he says that one can base the overall 
pollution standards on ethical considerations, like health and aesthet-
ics (pp. 210, 213). And indeed one can. But as he seems to realize 
(pp. 197-98), nobody has to do this - there is nothing in the TER 
concept that privileges "ethical" environmental concerns over "con-
sumer" concerns about, say, the cost of pollution controls.27 What 
does this mean? 'rt means that on the level of setting the overarching 
pollution limits, my private "preference" for keeping my dollars in my 
pocket gets into the same discussion with Sagoff's high ethical "value" 
for spending my consumer dollars to clean up duckponds in Arkansas. 
Is his ethical choice going to trump my personal preference? Nope. 
He may win or he may lose, but in principle, under a TER regime, the 
setting of overall pollution levels need not give his environmental eth-
ics any special place. Instead, a TER regime tries to figure out how 
much his ethical values are worth, vis-a-vis my low-life preference for 
cash. 
There's another way that TER-thinking messes up the purported 
opposition between values and preferences. Let's suppose that ethical 
values do have some privileged position at the policy level - that is, 
let's suppose they do count a bunch when we are setting overall stan-
d'ards, in the sense that we damn the costs in order to get, say, health-
ful air. Parenthetically, I agree with Sagoff that a lot of legislation 
does this, though perhaps not so much as he suggests.28 But even sup-
27. Indeed, costs - especially the costs of "do-your-best," technology-based pollution con-
trol devices - have been one of the major impulses for turning to TER-type approaches. See 
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at 1338-40; Note, Technology-Based Emission and EjJ/uent 
Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792 (1982) 
(criticizing performance standards as costlier and less beneficial than pollution-rights ap-
proaches); see also Krier & Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of 
Government Intervention, 13 NAT. REsOURCES J. 89, 99-101 (1973) (suggesting that interest in 
pollution pricing/trading schemes stems from lower costs of those schemes). TER schemes do 
have their critics; see Latin, supra note 3 (arguing that pollution entitlement schemes are practi-
cally unmanageable and undermine more feasible environmental control efforts based on technol-
ogy). Costs, of course, may be seen either as fiat cash, or (in more sophisticated versions) as the 
diversion of resources and related lost consumption opportunities. 
28. Sagoff often refers to sections of environmental or health statutes in which the legisla-
tures or the courts have stated that costs will not be counted, to suggest that costs are seldom or 
never considered in environmental laws. See, e.g .• pp. 36 (discussing Clean Air Act, Endangered 
Species Act), p. 84 (discussing Clean Air Act, OSHA), p. 197 (discussing several statutes). This 
gives a misleading impression. There are a number of statutory sections where costs are specifi-
cally mentioned. To give one example, § 111 of the Clean Air Act, dealing with uniform federal 
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posing that "values" rule at the standard-setting level, TER still takes 
the economists' position of agnosticism about values at a lower level. 
This means that if Sagoff and I both get a small allocation of the few 
tradeable pollution rights that are allowed, he can hoard his (to pro-
tect the air, which he values so highly). I will be delighted, because he 
is limiting an already-scarce supply even more, and making my pollu-
tion rights even more marketable. Because of his noble self-sacrifice, I 
can get an extra bundle when I sell my now-even-scarcer pollution 
rights to the styrofoam cup makers. Shoot, maybe I can get enough to 
finance a trip to Disneyland, and surely enough to go honkytonk-hop-
ping. What do I say to Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative? 
Hey, take gas, Manny Baby. 
The point is that if I can act this way under a TER regime, then 
the TER regime swallows up Sagoff 's ethical and public values in the 
great maw of economic devilry. What's notable about the book is that 
by the end, Sagoff seems to have fallen at least as far as the First 
Circle. 
Ill. REDEMPTION THROUGH RHETORIC 
So what is ailing our Faust, anyway? Why does he bum so hotly 
about economics, when he concedes so much? I think that what's get-
tmg to Sagoff is the rhetoric of economic discussion, not its category 
mistakes. 
Sagoff does not say this in so many words, but he implies that one 
aspect of economic rhetoric is me-first-ism.29 For all the supposed in-
difference to goals in economics, preference-talk has the sound of an 
irreducible egotism, and implies that preference bearers, in their end-
controls on stationary pollution sources, requires the Administrator to set performance standards 
based on the best available technological controls for emission reductions, "taking into consider-
ation the cost of achieving such emission reduction," as well as other health, environmental and 
energy considerations. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(l)(C) (1982). Sagoff himself notes in passing the cost 
considerations in this and other sections, p. 201, but only in his last-chapter conversion to taking 
costs seriously. And even there, when he directly quotes this section, he omits its reference to 
costs. Pp. 201, 207-08, 211. But cost considerations do come into play repeatedly in this and 
other areas of environmental law, despite grand statutory prefaces about eradication of pollution; 
the Clean Water Act, for example, makes a number of concessions to cost considerations, such as 
the provisions that permit the states to determine varying levels of water cleanliness for varying 
purposes, including agricultural and industrial purposes. See Clean Water Act, § 303(c)(2), 33 
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1982). The "Superfund" statute provides for a National Contingency Plan 
to set priorities for responses to hazardous substance releases, and requires that relative magni-
tudes of danger be taken into account as well as costs of remedies. Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act,§ 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
As noted above, the recent interest in emission-rights approaches is closely related to concerns 
that environmental regulation may be costlier than necessary. See supra note 27. For some 
observations on the relation of control costs to environmental benefits in environmental law, see 
Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk Management, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,208 
(1986) (discussing a "risk portfolio" approach). 
29. See, e.g., pp. 55-56 (suggesting that economists disregard or attempt to paper over non-
self-regarding choices). 
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less pulse-checking for their own preferences, really don't give two 
hoots about what their neighbors might want or need. Now, maybe 
this is a mistaken notion of what economists think, but mistaken or 
not, the rhetoric matters: If all this preference-talk gives you the idea 
that you are alone in caring about the neighbors, you may be less will-
ing to act in their behalf. Why be the sucker when the rest of them are 
all out for themselves?30 That sort of attitude, of course, leads every-
body down the primrose path to the old Prisoner's Dilemma, the ulti-
mate noncooperative end to what should be a cooperative game, the 
point where me-first-ism impoverishes all the players.31 
Environmental problems are often commons problems, and thus 
they present just such Prisoner's Dilemma "games";32 and insofar as 
this is true, as I mentioned earlier, the big task is to induce people to 
cooperate for the common good. In that task, it doesn't always help to 
have a very powerful rhetoric suggesting that charity and fellow-feel-
ing, while just as good as any other preferences, are really not to be 
expected - so get yours while you can. 
That is one rhetorical aspect of economic talk that may be getting 
under Sagoff's skin. I am less tentative about saying that he is both-
ered by a second rhetorical aspect: that is, the purported economic 
agnosticism about goals, which suggests that goals are all alike and 
that there is not really much point in talking about them. 33 So you 
like wilderness? says our economic poll-taker. Great - but let's not 
talk about why. Sagoff, on the other hand, wants to say that you can 
talk about these matters, and that there is something you can say to 
shape goals. 34 · 
On this point, although I disagree with Sagoff's sharp opposition 
between preferences and values, I think he is on to something. People 
do talk about the things they want; they change their minds as a result 
of discussion; they have informed views on what is desirable and why; 
they talk about traditions and practicalities - and this discussion puts 
them into a kind of fellowship with other participants in it, including 
those with whom they disagree on any particular issue. In this sense, 
Sagoff is not just being trendy in his appeal to Rorty and "delibera-
tion" or "persuasion."35 When I want to sell my pollution rights to 
30. On a related point, see Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1849, 1877-87 
(1987) (rhetoric of commodification may distort perceptions and attitudes about relationships 
among people). 
31. For this much-discussed "game," see R. HARDIN, supra note 21, at 24; Hirshleifer, supra 
note 21, at 13-14. 
32. See W. OPHULS, supra note 20, at 145-47. 
33. Sagoff focuses on this point at pp. 45-46 (cost-benefit analysis indifferent to values) and 
pp. 40-41, 80-81 (economists treat goals as "exogenous," to be toted up by "appropriate 
software"). 
34. E.g., p. 120. 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
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the plastics factory, maybe Sagoff and I can talk it over, and maybe he 
can talk me out of it. 
But how is he going to do that? The book is more than a bit frus-
trating on the things that go into our deliberation: What do we delib-
erate about, and especially, what kinds of topics will withstand the 
economic rhetoric that suggests we won't really deliberate at all? 
Sagoff's major way around this rhetoric is the appeal to "ethics" and 
to all those other things on the left-hand side of the list of oppositions. 
As I have said, I don't think these oppositions stand up very well. So 
what other routes are there to redeem our Faust and get him out of 
economic hell? What other counter-rhetorics might get around the 
rhetoric of Me-First and No-Discussion? 
One route Sagoff touches upon is the somewhat amorphous work 
that has been classed as "deep ecology" - a set of writings character-
ized by their urging that we acknowledge a kind of feeling-in and feel-
ing-with nature.36 This is not preference-talk, but kinship-talk. 
Sagoff's interesting chapter on the history of environmentalism brings 
up this way of talking, pointing out the symbolic impact of nature in 
our cultural history.37 
It takes a lot of nerve to get into a discussion of kinship with na-
ture, as the ideas can be easily pooh-poohed;38 besides, it is not alto-
gether clear that the concept - or feel - of deep ecology can be 
conveyed adequately by argumentative discourse at all. As Sagoff sug-
gests in his discussion of American literature,39 this kind of insight 
may only come through experience, or through artistic and narrative 
renditions of experience - which may be the reason why people like 
the photographer Ansel Adams and the storyteller Edward Abbey are 
so important in environmental history.40 Sagoff's discussion of an aes-
thetic or a narrative counter-rhetoric is an important contribution to 
the environmental "discussion" - and in my view considerably more 
provocative than his preferred argumentative rhetoric of "ethics." 
A second route or counter-rhetoric is an expanded version of 
rights. Sagoff mentions this route in his nods to libertarianism on the 
one hand (p. 16) and to animal-rights advocates on the other (pp. 156-
57). Rights-talk is tricky, though, because rights and entitlements are 
very much a part of the neoclassical economic baggage: Fixed and 
firm entitlements, one might think, are only there in order to assist in 
36. For a discussion of the various sources of this literature, see Devall, The Deep Ecology 
Movement, 20 NAT. REsoURCES J. 299 (1980). See especially id. at 309 (deep ecology tries to 
avoid focusing on human needs, instead tries "thinking like a mountain"). 
37. See ch. 6, "Nature and the National Idea,'' pp. 124-45, particularly pp. 141-44. 
38. See, e.g., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5-9 
(1974) (rejects idea that nature has normative content aside from human preferences). 
39. E.g., pp. 142-43. 
40. See Devall, supra note 36, at 308; R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 
263-65 (3d ed. 1982). 
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investment, trade, and all those Pareto-optimal moves in the Me-First 
universe.41 Maybe this explains why Sagoff himself is leery of rights-
talk.42 
But rights-talk has another rhetorical face as well. As Martha Mi-
now has pointed out, by applying rights-talk to such unexpected sub-
jects as children and the mentally disabled, one invites the listener to 
take seriously their condition.43 These unorthodox subjects are not at 
all the usual rights-bearers, who defend their own entitlements. But 
the very metaphoric quality of rights-rhetoric, on behalf of those who 
are somehow rights-disabled, bridges a gap to the more ordinary 
rights-holder, and adds drama to the plea to consider their situation, 
as if they could stand up for rights in a more conventional way. Thus 
rights-talk may borrow the neoclassical rhetoric of entitlement, but 
may turn that rhetoric around to lend gravity to the discussion of 
novel subjects. Minow uses this rhetorical tum for children, but one 
could do the same for animals and plants and places of breathtaking 
beauty. 
The tum-around in the rhetoric of rights suggests still another 
kind of counter-rhetoric, one that Sagoff eschews, though I think per-
haps too hastily. It is the counter-rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis, 
which seems to me to have done a good deal to get us off the mark in 
thinking about the desirable qualities of the natural environment. 
Sagoff feels a monumental fury about the "shadow-pricing" of envi-
ronmental benefits (pp. 88-92). He is right in a way; it does seem jar-
ring to cost out, say, the scenery at Mt. Whitney. 
But why shouldn't we see that shock as the same kind of shock 
that comes with the discussion of trees having rights?44 Why not see it 
as an effort to bridge a gap, to dramatize the value of things that are 
too easily ignored, to invite a discussion of the things we value, even 
though the neoclassical market rhetoric seems deaf and dumb about 
them? So what if we borrow that market language? We have to use 
what we have, and this talk may help to disarm those who would sim-
ply ignore environmental values. More important, the very pirating of 
41. See Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577-78, 605-06 
(1988); see also Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1363, 1392-94 (1984) (rights-talk 
is a part of capitalist culture and focuses on negative rights of individuals rather than positive 
claims of those in need); cf. Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk nor the "Critique of Rights" Too 
Seriously, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1405, 1415 (1984) (Tushnet offers no better alternative to rights 
rhetoric to support claims of needy). 
42. Sagoff, however, says that he rejects rights-talk in environmental law because the rights 
concept is either inconsistent or overly rigid. See pp. 156-57. 
43. See Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1866-67, 
1892-93, 1907-08, 1910-11 (1987) (second meaning of rhetoric of rights, inviting "conversation" 
about unconventional claims). 
44. See c. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATU-
RAL OBJECI'S (1974). For Stone's most recent effort, see c. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: 
THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987), which again focuses on the moral status of nonhu-
man things. 
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market-talk adds to its metaphoric power when we use that talk to 
dramatize things that are not bought and sold at all. It's a dangerous 
game, to be sure, but the imaginative use of rhetoric may open up 
some minds that would otherwise be closed. 
The major problem of environmentalism is that we live in an im-
perfect world of limited resources: There just isn't enough of every-
thing to have all we would like, or even all we think would be good for 
us. But in talking about the environment, we realize that we live in a 
limited rhetorical world, too. We can't talk about the natural sur-
roundings as we no doubt romantically dream that the Native Ameri-
cans did in olden times - with ease, grace, and transparent 
understanding of the awe and loveliness of the earth and its creatures. 
Instead, we have all this pinched yakking about what's mine, and 
what's yours, and how much you are going to have to pay me if you 
want to get what's mine. But there are ways to build on this rhetoric, 
ways to move out from under its limitations. 
Sagoff's book gropes toward a different rhetoric, and while he con-
centrates on his sharp distinctions between ethics and economics, I 
think he makes a much more substantial contribution with his brief 
discussion of narrative and artistic renderings of the experience of na-
ture. Still, my chief concern is that he is neglecting the rhetorical re-
sources that are available in other standard ways of talking. On the 
subject of economics in particular, his book sends the very mixed -
but still rather conventional -· signals of sin and salvation. A less 
belligerent exploration, on the other hand, might have opened up some 
more creative rhetorical possibilities in the language of rights, entitle-
ments, and even costs and benefits. But whatever the price the book 
pays to its own Manicheanism, it does make some important contribu-
tions, and I have to hand it to Sagoff: What he has done better than 
anybody else so far is to point out that the way we talk about the 
environment is going to influence the way we think about it, and the 
things we do about it. 
